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ABSTRACT 
 
The ability of the Social Security retirement program to pay the promised benefits to future 
generations has been debated since the 1960s. Various suggestions have been made, but the one 
that has attracted the most passionate opinions has been whether some or all of the Social 
Security Trust Funds should be invested in the stock market, which would yield higher returns 
than on the Federal government issued bonds (Treasury Bonds).  
 
In reviewing 88 years of financial market data going back to 1926, the author shows that investing 
in the stock market (using the S&P 500 as the proxy) will most probably produce higher returns 
for the U.S. taxpayer (investor) over the long term, but the investor will have to be prepared for a 
roller-coaster ride of highs and lows. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he debate over privatizing all or part of the Social Security Trust Fund can be traced to 1964 when 
Senator Barry Goldwater, then Republican Party Presidential Candidate, made it a central part of his 
political campaign. However, Robert A. Rankin observed the following in the San Jose Mercury 
News (July 26, 1998, pg. 1E): 
  
In 1964, presidential candidate Barry Goldwater was so ridiculed for suggesting that Social Security become 
voluntary that his campaign never recovered. Even in the Reagan and Bush years, lawmakers of both parties agreed 
that Social security was the “third rail of politics” -- touch it with any proposed change and you will die.  
 
 In spite of this dire warning to politicians, the issue of privatizing Social Security (SS) has been vigorously 
debated over the past fifty years in political campaigns, by Presidential Appointed Task Forces, by so-called 
independent think-tanks, and in the news media. A Google search for “privatizing social security” presented 383,000 
results and a similar search of the LexisNexis Academic data base presented 1,000 results. Every president or his 
cabinet member since the 1960s has appointed a task force to make recommendations to ensure the financial 
stability of the SS programs and to provide reasonable retirement and insurance benefits to its contributors; namely, 
the workers and their families.  
  
 In reviewing 88 years of financial market data going back to 1926, the author shows that investing in the 
stock market will most probably produce higher returns for the U.S. taxpayer (investor) over the long term, but the 
investor will have to be prepared for a roller-coaster ride of highs and lows. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 Numerous proposals have been made over the past fifty years regarding the payroll surpluses that are held 
in the Social Security Trust Fund (henceforth referred to as the Trust Fund). These proposals are best summarized by 
T 
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the 13-person Advisory Council on Social Security appointed in June 1994 by Dr. Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of 
Health and Human Services. Table 1 (see Appendix) is a summary of the three conflicting proposals made by the 
13-person Council, which was split into three factions, in their Final Report submitted in December 2006 
(http://www.socialsecurity.gov/; Search for “1994-1996 Advisory Council”). 
 
 The Advisory Council members were bitterly divided with six of the 13 members opposed to the most 
important changes recommended by the other seven members.  The six members were distressed at the surge of 
interest in “privatizing” part of SS. The suggested plans varied from allowing some of the payroll taxes to be 
invested in the stock market, which would be strictly supervised by an investment advisory panel under Plan 1 
(referred to as “Maintain Benefits”). At the other side, allowing for individual accounts into which workers could 
choose from an array of five to ten mutual funds under Plan 3 (referred to as Individual Accounts). Plan 2 (referred 
to as Personal Security Accounts) is a compromise between Plans 1 and 3 and would create a two-tier system 
consisting of a flat Federal benefit and a mandatory personal security account managed by workers. These three 
plans have been used in subsequent years as a basis for suggested changes to the existing SS retirement program. An 
important point to note is that the current system, which has been in place for the past 60 years, allows for payment 
of retirement benefits to the worker and his/her spouse, for disability benefits, and benefits to the spouse and minor 
children of a worker who dies before reaching retirement age.  In short, the SS programs have a comprehensive life 
insurance component in addition to their retirement benefits. 
  
 The Existing Plan (under current law) and Plan 1 are similar to a defined benefit plan (DBP), where the 
Federal government promises to pay the defined benefits to the beneficiaries with the result that the U.S. taxpayer 
will ultimately be responsible for making the promised payments. Therefore, Under Plan 1, the gains and losses 
from investing in the stock market would be borne by the taxpayer. Under Plan 3, which is similar to a defined 
contribution plan (DCP), the gains and losses from investing in the stock market would be borne by the worker. The 
author characterizes Plan 2 as a “Quasi Defined Benefit Plan” which has elements of a DBP and a DCP. 
 
 The author decided to focus on the above Advisory Council because their work during the 1994-1996 
period was conducted when stock market prices were strongly influenced by the “dot com boom”, while the Trust 
Fund was showing relatively modest returns from its portfolio of fixed income securities issued by the Federal 
Reserve Bank (Treasury Securities). For example, returns for the S&P 500 and for the Old-Age and Survivors 
Insurance (OASI) for the 1991-1996 period are presented in Table 2. The OASI Trust fund is the most significant 
part of SS. 
 
Table 2:  
Returns in Early 1990s: S&P 500 versus Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI)  
 
Year OASI Assets at start of Year Interest Earned Interest Rate Earned S&P 500 Returns 
1991 $214.2 billion $20.8 billion 9.2 percent 30.5 percent 
1992 $267.9 $24.3 8.7 7.6 
1993 $319.2 $27.0 8.3 10.1 
1994 $369.3 $30.0 8.0 1.3 
1995 $413.5 $32.8 7.9 37.6 
1996 $458.4 $35.7 7.8 23.0 
 
 These financial results were evaluated in the context of the estimates by the Chief Actuary in the Annual 
Reports of the Social Security Administration (SSA).  In the 1996 Annual Report, he estimated that the OASI Trust 
Fund would be depleted by 2029, using the intermediate assumption (page 6). Similar estimates were issued each 
year and the Trustees usually concluded by stating: “With informed discussion, creative thinking, and timely 
legislative actions, Social Security can continue to protect future generations” (page 5 of 2013 Report).  
 
 A search of The Clute Institute website for published articles on “social security” yielded 15 articles that 
are directly or indirectly related to the issues discussed in this article.  Four articles are included in this literature 
review and are discussed in the chronological order that they were published. 
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 Pritchard and Potter (February 2006) in “Proposed Changes to Social Security: An Analysis” listed 12 
possible changes. These suggested changes include reducing future benefits, increase payroll taxes, increase income 
taxes on benefits, increase estate tax to fund the SS programs, and require all state and local government workers to 
enroll in the SS programs.  
 
 Caliendo and Atkins (April 2006) in “The President’s Social Security Plan: How much would you pay to 
participate?” used a simple life-cycle model to analyze whether or not Private Investment Accounts (PIAs) would 
benefit workers. They found: “In most circumstances, workers would benefit from the private account program. 
Only when marker rates are very low or a person expects to live for a very long time does the current pay-as-you-go 
system give a greater present value to a worker.”  
 
 Ekmekjian, Haroian and Snyder (October 2006), in “Social Security: Personal Investment Accounts 
(PIAS)”, identified seven major issues that need to be addressed if PIAs were to replace the current SS program. 
They conclude that: 
 
….on a straight financial basis, the dollar value of PIAs exceeds the narrowly defined SS benefit by a wide margin. The 
current SS program continues to benefit workers, both male and female, that are at or near the retirement age. For all 
others, a total or partial investment in PIAs provides a greater total dollar portfolio and, depending upon one’s 
investment strategy, even provides for death bequest to one’s heirs. The examination has not taken into account 
COLA’s, administrative fees or management fees for PIAs. In addition, the transitional or management costs and the 
impact on the current SS program have not been examined. 
 
 Pritchard and Potter (January 2008), in “Reducing the Downside Risk of Not Receiving Anticipated Social 
Security Benefits by Using Personal Accounts”, explores Plan 2 (Personal Security Accounts) that was suggested in 
the Report of the 1994-1996 Advisory Council. They present the argument that: 
   
…. opting for a personal account in conjunction with traditional Social Security is less risky than opting to have 
all of one’s Social Security taxes go into traditional Social Security.  The overall downside risk of receiving lower 
than anticipated Social Security retirement income is reduced by diversifying to include personal accounts along 
with traditional Social Security. 
 
 Based on the author’s review of the literature where the pros and cons of the various options/proposals to 
reform the SS program have been debated, the author is in favor of Plan 1 (“Maintain Benefits”) where a significant 
portion of the Trust Fund is invested in the stock market. This would allow for the current DBP benefits to continue 
and the stock market risk would be borne by the U.S. Federal government and ultimately the taxpayer.  
 
88-YEAR HISTORY OF FINANCIAL MARKET PERFORMANCE IN THE U.S. 
 
 Ibbotson SBBI 2014 Classic Yearbook, published annually by Morningstar, is an excellent source of 
financial data going back to 1926. In Table 3 (see Appendix), annualized compound returns are presented for: 1) 
large company stocks (S&P 500 stock market index); 2) long-term corporate bonds (20-year maturity); 3) long-term 
government bonds (Treasury Bonds with 20-year maturity); 4) intermediate-term government bonds (Treasury 
Notes with 5-year maturity); 5) Treasury Bills (30-day maturity); and 6) inflation rate (consumer price index). 
 
 The S&P 500 produced an annual average compound return of 10.1 percent for the 1926-2013 period (88 
years), which is substantially greater than for fixed income securities. Treasury Bonds (20-year) had an average of 
5.5 percent, which was 4.6 percent below returns on the S&P 500. The 88 years of data is then divided into nine 
decades (with the 1920s as only half a decade). The S&P 500 out-performed Treasury Bonds (20-year) in seven of 
the nine decades, except for the 1930s and 2000s. However, S&P 500’s excess return in the 1970s was only 0.4 
percent (5.9 percent versus 5.5 percent) which can be attributed to the high rates of inflation (average of 7.4 percent, 
which is the highest in any decade). The Stock Market Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression of the 1930s had a 
devastating impact on the private sector of the economy so that returns on Treasury Bonds (20-year) exceeded S&P 
500 returns by 5.0 percent, on average, in the 1930-1939 period. The “Bursting of the Dotcom Bubble” in 2000 and 
the “Financial Crisis” of 2007-2008 had similar impacts in the last decade on the private sector of the economy so 
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that returns on Treasury Bonds (20-year) exceeded S&P 500 returns by 8.6 percent, on average, during the 2000-
2009 period. Similar results are found by analyzing the following recent ten-year periods: Treasury Bonds (20-year) 
returns exceeded S&P 500 returns by 5.2 percent, on average, during the 2001-2010 period; by 6.0 percent during 
the 2002-2011 period; and by 0.4 percent during the 2003-2012 period. However, S&P 500 returns exceeded 
Treasury Bonds (20-year) returns by 1.3 percent, on average, during the 2004-2013 period due to the 32.4% return 
in the S&P 500 in 2013. The well-below par performance of the stock market in the past 14 years, beginning in 
2000, should cause some anxiety to potential investors. The higher average returns in the S&P 500 should also be 
evaluated relative to the higher volatility in these returns during the 88 years, which will be addressed in the next 
section. The financial performance in Table 3 is well summarized on pages 33-34 of Ibbotson SBBI 2014 Classic 
Yearbook: 
 
The great stock and bond market rise of the 1980s and 1990s was one of the most unusual in the history of the 
capital markets. In terms of the magnitude of the rise, these decades most closely resembled the 1920s and 1950s. 
These four decades accounted for a majority of the market’s cumulative total return over the past 88 years.  
  
While the importance of a long-term view of investing is noted in this book and elsewhere, the counterpart of this 
observation is: To achieve high returns on your investments, you only need to participate in the few periods of truly 
outstanding returns. The bull markets of 1922 to mid-1929, 1949-1961(roughly speaking, the Fifties), mid-1982 to 
mid-1987, and 1991-1999 were such periods. . . . .  
  
The 17 ½ year period starting in mid-1982 and ending in 1999 comprised a rare span of time in which investors 
quickly accumulated wealth.  
 
 The volatility of the stock market is aptly captured in a speech given by Alan Greenspan, Chair of the U.S. 
Federal Reserve Board, on December 5, 1996.  He asked, “But how do we know when irrational exuberance has 
unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and prolong contractions as they have in 
Japan over the past decade?” The phrase “irrational exuberance” stuck in the mindset and Robert Shiller, 2013 
Nobel Laureate in Economics, made it the title of his best-selling book, first published in 2000, on the over-
valuation of U.S. stocks. Shiller has a website where he reports price-earnings data at the end of each month and 
comments on the state of the stock and housing markets (http://www.irrationalexuberance.com/). 
    
THE SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAM AND INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE OF THE OASI TRUST 
FUND 
 
 The SS Program commenced operations in January 1937 and was designed as a “pay-as-you-go” system 
where retired beneficiaries were paid their monthly annuities from payroll taxes collected from active workers and 
their employers. This system continues to operate today, except that it now has two parts - Old-Age and Survivors 
Insurance (OASI) and Disability Insurance (DI) - collectively referred to as OASDI. They have separate trust 
accounts and different payroll tax rates.  The current situation is well captured on page 2 of the 2013 Annual Report 
of the Trustees: 
 
At the end of 2012, the OASDI program was providing benefits to about 57 million people: 40 million retired 
workers and dependents of retired workers, 6 million survivors of deceased workers, and 11 million disabled 
workers and dependents of disabled workers. During the year, an estimated 161 million people had earnings 
covered by Social Security and paid payroll taxes. Total expenditures in 2012 were $786 billion. Total income was 
$840 billion, which consisted of $731billion in non-interest income and $109 billion in interest earnings. Asset 
reserves held in special issue U.S. Treasury securities grew from $2,678 billion at the beginning of the year to 
$2,732 billion at the end of the year. 
  
 The computation of the monthly retirement benefit paid to a retiree is fairly complex, but the important 
point is that it is more of a DBP that is not directly affected by the investment performance of the OASI Trust Fund. 
The normal retirement age (referred to as full retirement age) varies from 65 to 67 years depending on when the 
worker was born. However, early retirement can be taken at age 62 and retirement benefits must be taken no later 
than age 70. 
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 In Table 4, annualized compound returns are presented for large company stocks (S&P 500 stock market 
index) and for Special Issue Government Bonds (SIGBs) held by the OASI Trust Fund. The SIGBs are issued by the 
U.S. Treasury Department and managed through their Bureau of Public Debt. The SIGBs have maturities ranging 
from 1 to 15 years. The data are primarily for a 62-year period from 1950 to 2012. This 62-year period provides a 
more stable political and economic environment after the end of World War II in 1945. The S&P 500 produced an 
annual average compound return of 11.0 percent for the 1950-2012 period, which is substantially greater than the 
5.9 percent for the SIGBs, resulting in an excess of 5.1 percent. The 62 years of data are then divided into six 
decades. The S&P 500 out-performed SIGBs in four of the six decades, except for the 1970s and 2000s. The SIGBs 
produced average excess returns of 0.3 percent in the 1970s (6.2 percent versus 5.9 percent), which can be attributed 
to the high rates of inflation (average of 7.4 percent, which is the highest in any decade as per Table 2). As stated 
earlier, the “Bursting of the Dotcom Bubble” in 2000 and the “Financial Crisis” of 2007-2008 had a similar impact 
in the last decade so that returns on SIGBs exceeded S&P 500 returns by 6.7 percent, on average, during the 2000-
2009 period (-0.9 percent for S&P 500 versus 5.8 percent for SIGBs). The substantial stock price gains of the 
“Dotcom era” have been wiped out by losses in the last decade. However, the data in Table 3 show that the S&P 500 
has out-performed the SIGBs in two of the past three years - in 2010, S&P 500 return of 15.1 percent versus 4.6 
percent for SIGBs; in 2011, S&P 500 return of 2.1 percent was below the 4.4 percent for SIGBs; and in 2012, S&P 
500 return of 16.0 percent versus 4.1 percent for SIGBs. Furthermore, the S&P 500 return of 32.4 percent for 2013 
will be well in excess of the return on SIGBs. The return for the latter is not available at this time. 
 
 The author has been focusing on the compound annualized returns, which fail to capture the variations in 
return (volatility or risk). The volatility of returns is best measured by determining the arithmetic mean (simple 
average), the standard deviation (std. dev.) around it, and the resulting coefficient of variation (CV), which is the 
standard deviation divided by the arithmetic mean. CV is a form of risk-reward ratio in that it measures how much 
variation in returns there is for each 1 percent mean return. CV allows one to compare returns over time and also 
across different types of investments. A risk-averse investor prefers low CV ratios because it provides the smallest 
variation per 1 percent return. The arithmetic mean (simple average) is not used widely in measuring financial 
performance because it provides a linear growth rate in returns rather than an exponential growth rate.  The latter is 
captured by the compound rate (also called geometric mean return) because it allows for growth-on-growth 
(compounding). The arithmetic mean is greater than the compound average (geometric mean) and the difference is 
greater when there is a large standard deviation. Paquette (2005) shows the difference in results between geometric 
mean and arithmetic mean when there are significant variations in returns during the period under review. 
 
 A review of Table 4 shows that the CV for S&P 500 is significantly greater than for SIGBs across all six 
periods because of the substantially large standard deviations for stocks. Participating in the stock market can result 
in large gains and losses over time compared to the stable returns from government-issued fixed income securities.  
The CV of 17.6 for the 2000-2009 period is extremely high and, as stated earlier, it is due to the well below par 
performance of the stock market in the last decade, which should cause some anxiety to potential investors.  
 
 The “roller-coaster ride” experienced by investors holding stocks in large companies since 1995, for 
example, can best be appreciated by reviewing Table 5 where the following are shown: 1) the steady growth in 
OASI assets which are primarily in SIGBs, 2) the growth in interest earned from SIGBs, 3) the decrease in the 
average rate of interest earned on SIGBs, and 4) the volatile S&P 500 returns. The S&P 500 had 14 years of positive 
returns (a high of 37.6 percent in 1995 and a low of 2.1 percent in 2011) but also had four years of substantial losses 
(-9.1 percent in 2000, -11.9 percent in 2001, -22.1 percent in 2003, and -37.0 percent in 2008). Returns on SIGBs 
exceeded those on the S&P 500 in six of the 18 years (the above four years of losses and in 2005 and 2011). The 
annual returns show the ups and downs of holding stocks, but the S&P 500 still out-performed SIGBs by 2.42 
percent (8.56 percent versus 6.14 percent) over the recent 18-year period. Returns on SIGBs have been declining 
steadily, from 7.9 percent in 1995 to 4.1 percent in 2012, which reflects the long-term perceptions of financial 
market participants who are spread around the world investing in stocks, bonds, financial derivatives, real estate, and 
commodities. For example, the “Sovereign Debt Crises” in the euro-zone increased the demand for U.S. Federal 
government-issued fixed income securities causing interest rates to remain low because the U.S. is a relatively safe-
haven for investors. However, the “Sovereign Debt Crises” also had a negative impact on U.S. stocks because U.S. 
companies were exporting less to Europe and deriving less revenue from their European operations. 
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 Almost all OASI assets are held in SIGBs and they increased from $413.5 billion at the beginning of 1995 
to $2,524.1 billion (or $2.542 trillion) at the end of 2011 (an increase of 610 percent over 17 years). The debate over 
privatizing SS continues today with some financial experts suggesting that liquidating some of the SIGBs and 
investing the money in the private sector would help boost the overall economy.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The three plans proposed by the 13-person Advisory Council in 1996, with no majority support for any of 
the plans, show the complexity of the issues. Politicians have failed to garner sufficient support from the electorate 
to implement any form of privatizing the current SS retirement programs. The privatizing of all or part of the SS 
retirement programs would convert it from a DBP to a DCP, wholly or partly, and payments from the latter plan 
would depend on financial market performances, which can be risky. Furthermore, the current program also 
provides life insurance protection to the worker and or his/her dependents as well as disability insurance. These 
comprehensive benefits offered by the SS programs and the “irrational exuberances” of stock markets could well 
explain the resilience of the program in its present form.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1 
Summary of Proposals of the 1994-1996 Advisory Council on Social Security 
 
Overview 
Mandatory Savings 
Accounts 
Trust Fund Investment 
Policy 
Income From 
Mandatory Savings 
Accounts 
Current Law 
Pays benefits to retired and 
disabled workers and their 
families and to survivors of 
workers who die. Benefits 
are financed by specially 
earmarked taxes. 
None. 
Money in the Social 
Security trust fund and 
can be invested only in 
Government securities, 
not in private stocks or 
bonds. 
Not applicable. 
Plan 1: "Maintain 
Benefits" 
Maintains current benefit 
structure with modest 
changes in benefits and 
revenues, and perhaps a 
new investment policy for 
the Social Security trust 
fund. 
None. 
40 percent of trust fund 
money might be invested 
in private market (after 
further Federal study). 
Investments would be 
passively managed by an 
independent board to 
follow some broad index 
of market performance. 
Not applicable. 
Plan 2: Personal 
Security Accounts 
Creates a two-tier system, 
consisting of a flat Federal 
benefit and a mandatory 
personal security account 
managed by individuals. 
Transition to new system 
would be financed with 
new Government 
borrowing, taxes or both. 
40 percent of current 
payroll taxes are 
redirected into personal 
security accounts. 
Workers can invest the 
money as they want, in 
a wide range of 
financial instruments. 
No change from current 
law.       
Money in account 
becomes available 
when worker 
becomes eligible for 
Social Security 
retirement benefits. 
Worker uses it as he 
or she chooses. At 
time of death, any 
money in the 
account goes into 
the worker’s estate. 
Plan 3: Individual 
Accounts 
Scales back benefits to fit 
within current payroll tax 
revenues. Adds a new 
mandatory individual 
savings plan, to be 
administered by the 
Government. 
Workers pay an 
additional 1.6 percent of 
earnings into individual 
accounts. Workers have 
a limited number of 
investment options, 
perhaps 5 to 10 mutual 
funds. 
No change from current 
law.  
Individual account is 
automatically 
converted to 
annuities when 
worker retires. 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/; (Search for "1994-1996 Advisory Council") 
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Table 2: Compound Annual Rates Of Returns By Decade (%) 
 1926 - 2013 
(88 Years) 
1926 – 
1929 
1930 – 
1939 
1940 – 
949 
1950 – 
1959 
1960 – 
1969 
1970 – 
1979 
1980 – 
1989 
1990 – 
1999 
2000 – 
2009 
Large Company 
Stocks (S&P 500) 
10.1 19.2 -0.1 9.2 19.4 7.8 5.9 17.6 18.2 -0.9 
Long Term Corporate 
Bonds 
(20 Years Maturity) 
6.0 5.2 6.9 2.7 1.0 1.7 6.2 13.0 8.4 7.6 
Long Term 
Government Bonds 
(20% Years)  
5.5 5.0 439 3.2 -0.1 1.4 5.5 12.6 8.8 7.7 
Intermediate Term 
Government Bonds 
(5 Years) 
5.3 4.2 4.6 1.8 1.3 3.5 7.0 11.9 7.2 6.2 
Treasury Bills 
(30 Days) 
3.5 3.7 0.6 0.4 1.9 3.9 6.3 8.9 4.9 2.8 
Inflation 3.0 -1.1 -2.0 5.4 2.2 2.5 7.4 5.1 2.9 2.5 
S&P 500 Minus Long 
Term Govt. Bonds  
(20 Years) 
4.6 14.2 -5.0 6.0 19.5 6.4 0.4 5. 9.4 -8.6 
 
 2001-2010 2002-2011 2003-2012 2004-2013 
Large Company Stocks (S&P 500) 1.4 2.9 7.1 7.4 
Long Term Corporate Bonds 
(20 Years Maturity) 
7.6 8.3 7.8 6.4 
Long Term Government Bonds 
(20% Years)  
6.6 8.9 7.5 6.1 
Intermediate Term Government Bonds 
(5 Years) 
5.6 5.8 6.2 4.4 
Treasury Bills 
(30 Days) 
2.2 1.8 1.6 1.5 
Inflation 2.3 2.5 2.4 2.4 
S&P 500 Minus Long Term Govt. Bonds 
(20 Years) 
-5.2 -6.0 -0.4 1.3 
Data from Table 1-4 (page 33) and Table 2-1 (page 40); Ibbotson SBBI 2014 Classic Yearbook; Morningstar (2014) and from previous editions 
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Table 3 
Annual Rates of Returns by Decade (%): S&P 500 versus Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) 
 
1950-2012 
(63 Years) 
1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 
Large Company Stocks 
(S&P 500) - Compound 
11.0 19.4 7.8 5.9 17.6 18.2 -0.9 
Special Issue Government Bonds 
(SIGB) - Compound 
5.9 2.5 3.3 6.2 10.4 8.1 5.8 
Premium Earned 
by S&P 500 over SIGB 
5.1 16.9 4.5 -0.3 7.2 10.1 -6.7 
 
S&P 500 - Arithmetic Mean 
(Average) 
12.5 20.8 8.7 7.5 18.2 19.0 1.2 
S&P 500 - Standard Deviation 
(Std Dev) 
17.6 19.8 14.4 19.2 12.7 14.2 21.1 
S&P 500 - Coefficient of Variation 
(CV) = Mean/Std Dev 
1.4 1.0 1.7 2.6 0.7 0.7 17.6 
S&P 500 - Number of Years 
With Negative Returns 
14 (22%) 2 (20%) 3 (30%) 3 (30%) 1 (10%) 1 (10%) 4 (40%) 
        
SIGB - Arithmetic Mean 
(Average) 
5.9 2.5 3.3 6.2 10.4 8.1 5.8 
SIGB - Standard Deviation 
(Std Dev) 
2.8 0.2 0.7 1.0 1.2 0.8 0.7 
SIGB - Coefficient of Variation 
(CV) = Mean/Std Dev 
0.5 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 
 
  2010 2011 2012    
Large Company Stocks 
(S&P 500) 
 15.1 2.1 16.0    
Special Issue Government Bonds 
(SIGB) 
 4.6 4.4 4.1    
Premium Earned 
by S&P 500 over SIGB 
 10.5 -2.3 11.9    
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Table 4 
Annual Rates Of Returns For The 1995-2012 Period (18 Years): S$P 500 Versus Old-Age And Survivors Insurance (OASI) 
Year OASI Assets at Start 
of Year ($ billions) 
Interest Earned on 
SIGBs ($ billions) 
Interest Rate 
on SIGBs (%) 
S&P 500 Returns 
Excess Returns 
by S&P 500 
1995 413.5 32.8 7.9 37.6 29.7 
1996 458.5 35.7 7.8 23.0 15.2 
1997 514.0 39.8 7.7 33.4 25.6 
1998 589.1 44.5 7.6 28.6 21.0 
1999 681.6 49.8 7.3 21.0 13.7 
2000 798.8 57.5 7.2 -9.1 -16.3 
2001 931.0 64.7 6.9 -11.9 -18.8 
2002 1071.5 71.2 6.6 -22.1 -28.7 
2003 1217.5 75.2 6.2 28.7 22.5 
2004 1355.3 79.1 5.8 10.9 5.0 
2005 1500.6 84.0 5.6 4.9 -0.7 
2006 1663.0 91.8 5.5 15.8 10.3 
2007 1844.3 97.0 5.3 5.5 0.2 
2008 2023.6 105.3 5.2 -37.0 -42.2 
2009 2203.9 107.9 4.9 26.5 21.6 
2010 2336.8 108.2 4.6 15.1 10.4 
2011 2429.0 106.5 4.4 2.1 -2.3 
2012 2524.1 102.8. 4.1 16.0 11.9 
Compound return   6.14% 8.56% 2.42% 
Arithmetic mean 
(average) 
  6.15% 10.48% 4.33% 
Standard deviation 
 (Std dev) 
  1.27% 20.07%  
Coefficient of variant 
(CV) 
  0.21 1.91  
S&P 500 data from Table 2-2 (pages 41-42); Ibbotson 2014 Classic Yearbook; Morningstar (2014) 
Special Issue Government Bonds data from Annual Reports of the Trustee; http://ssa.gov/OACT/TR/index.html 
 
